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Many of the ICT facilities in Developing Countries’ educational institutions are not used and ICT for Development project have high rates of failure. In this paper I argue that the  lack of maintenance and local ownership of technology, although widely recognized as key factors for the success or failure of any ICT4D project (Odedra-Straub, 1993; Heeks, 2002, 2009; Unwin, 2009), lay widely overlooked for structural reasons, embedded in the foreign aid "machinery". Bureaucracies’ requirements, transaction costs, sustainability concerns, mutual perception and identity negotiation between "developer" and "developee" and above all, a mechanistic mindset for both education and reality in general, are crucial factors in shaping the project implementation, often in stark contrast with the optimistic rethoric about it. As a subset of ICT4D, ICT4Education projects are no exception and it is precisely the pedagogical side to be most affected by such negligence.
The role of technology is addressed critically, as an amplifier of the ruling and management cultures (Toyama, 2010), be it instructionist versus constructionist in pedagogy, or top down versus bottom up in the aid approach. A radical change of attitude is called for, one to be applied both to aid and education.
My reasoning stems from my fresh, direct experience in multiple such projects in Burundi during the last five years, setting up computer rooms in public technical high schools both with small NGOs and a bilateral cooperation agency and training the local teachers to administer them. 

2. The rules of the game
2.1. Bureaucracy compliancy
While being absent from almost all official reports, the bureaucratic and administrative mechanisms behind the scenes of development projects heavily condition and constrain the possibilities for an effective introduction of technology in the school ecosystem. Despite the rhetoric on administrative simplification recurring in most official documents produced by the international aid community in the last decade (UN, 2002, 2005; G8, 2002; OECD, 2003; Blair, 2005) many donors' bureaucracies still appear to underestimate the critical infrastructural limitations their operators in most low HDI (L-HDI) countries face and therefore they expect the same "traceability" they ask for in higher HDI ranking countries (H-HDI)​[1]​. The result is that project management choices are often influenced by an understandable desire of minimising administrative paperwork (and the related risks of controls and errors), rather than focusing on local educational needs. 
In some cases this may lead to an authentic bureaucratic paradox, in that the only way for the development agent in the field to fulfill the unrealistic bureaucratic procedures designed to prevent artifice is to use artifice. I am referring to trivial artifice, the most innocent of which might be using personal money to buy something swiftly in order to avoid the otherwise required lengthy paperwork. From my experience, even with the fullest honesty and goodwill, it is plainly impossible to entirely comply with the often unrealistic administrative requirements without such workarounds. Life in the field is too dynamic and complex to obey to those requirements and if you want to maintain your word and carry out the planned activities at all, sooner or later you will find yourself forced to trespass "for administrative reasons".  

2.2. Role play
This is particularly relevant in development projects, because of its symbolic consequences. In fact, most cooperation&development projects are carried out by allochthonous development agents, namely white expatriates from rich countries. At their arrival, they step on a stage where the cooperation&development opera has been playing for long (Goffman, 1959), constantly evolving ever since this theatrical genre has been invented, in the aftermath of World War II. Yet, the overall structure of the piece has not changed much, with developer and developee constantly negotiating their respective roles and mutually reconfirming them. In my experience in the field this is still the mainstream structure of the play, despite all the rhetoric about equality, participatory approaches (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Thompson, 2008) which seems to be limited to few, yet laudable examples (Byrne & Sahay, 2007). 
If we had the description of the developer's role, it will almost certainly read that one of his defining duty is "to teach and defend the respect of the rules in the name of good governance" - no matter what the specific field of intervention is. Given this underlying assumption, it becomes then clear how an apparently trivial trespassing of the sort mentioned above (cf. § 2.1) can pass the message to the local partner, aka developee, that even the developer sometimes bends those sacred rules. How and to what extent, lies in the actor's personal interpretation of his developer role, but surely a trainer who is often late cannot expect his trainees to be punctual.

2.3. Transaction costs
When working in low IDI​[2]​ countries (ITU, 2009, p. 49) where development projects need - or prefer - to import technology from the donor's country, transaction costs are generally very high. From identifying local technological needs, to carefully list hardware technical specifications, to the launching of the international tender, the analysis of the providers' offers, the choice of the winner, the refinement and signature of the contract, the shipping, the transport in containers, the customs, the delivery and the inventory on site... it is a massive amount of tedious work that nobody wants to do twice. Thus, from the donor's point of view, the more comprehensive the bulk, the better. However, it is structurally impossible not to make mistakes when writing these listings, for the following reasons:
	a certain degree of human error is inevitable;
	there is an intrinsic, structural mismatch between those who assess the needs in order to prepare the listing and the context of application, especially when  doing it for the first time: 

"Industrialized-country stakeholders, such as consultants or IT vendors or aid donors, often dominate the IS [Information System] design process in DCs [Developing Countries]. Those stakeholders bring their context with them and, even if located in a developing country, they will inscribe that context into their IS designs: inscriptions that will mismatch DC actuality" (Heeks, 2002, p. 106).

To "debug the listing and re-run the cumbersome import algorithm" is a very costly option, both in terms of labour and money. So? You better live with those mistakes and try to find a solution locally, which is not always possible, as certain components might not be available in the local market (i.e. specific printers cartridges).

From the beneficiaries' perspective instead, the larger the bulk of imported goods, the harder it is to "digest" it. Generally, no spare parts or consumable are provided (Odedra-Straub, 1993), under the justification that those account as running costs expenditures and and therefore are intended to be provided by the beneficiaries. In my experience, rarely ICT4D projects go as far as questioning whether these extra running costs, hidden under the hood of that one shiny new colour printer, are affordable for the school administration, who might be struggling finding the money to buy enough chalk for all its blackboards.
Moreover, ICT4D project managers tend not to provide sufficient training to let recipients develop a proper ownership of this prestigious and "modernising" technological gift. By proper ownership I mean the capacity not just to use the technology, but to maintain it as well, teaching how to service it when needed (Heeks, 2005). 
Why is it so?

2.4. Mechanistic, control driven approach
There is an inherent perceptual bias in the system that favorises things over processes, as things, like computers, can be readily pictured and shown to donors, who hardly question them, while processes, like learning, take a much longer time to unravel (often beyond the term of the project), are inherently harder to capture and therefore much more questionable. 
In my experience, this bias towards the setup of a physical technological infrastructure over the educational use of it, is embedded in the very nature of current cooperation&development project management practices​[3]​, as the whole system revolves around quantitative controls and standards. This approach has three important side-effects:
(1)	it reduces the project management commitment to ensure a beneficial use of technology in everyday teaching practices; 
(2)	it tends to prefer the use of simplistic objective indicators (i.e. ratio computer to pupils, number of hours the school's computer room is open);
(3)	it treats technology use as a subject in itself, rather than as a teaching and learning enhancer to serve other disciplines. 

In other words, the objective learning indicator is more likely to be How many pupils use the computer lab to learn office automation software, rather than How many teachers use the computer lab to creatively enhance the teaching of their specific subject. This is not to say that basic computer skills like the ones associated with office automation software are not important, but rather to stress the need to aim higher and think of ICTs in education as a versatile "swiss knife" for the teacher. 

2.4. Whose sustainability counts?
For the scope of this paper, I define sustainability as the permanence of a flow of benefits within the system, after the development project has ended and the external funding is extinguished. Based on my direct experience and despite the public, well intentioned rhetoric on project sustainability, there is a problematic misunderstanding here, as the sustainability at stake is not beneficiaries', but rather the project manager's one, be it an individual, an NGO or an international development agency. In other words, the system is such that the first and most important concern of any development agent is to "stay in the game and keep playing". This translates into a strong pressure to comply with the donors' plans and requirements, to make sure that from an administrative point of view, the project management is flawless, so that next time you will be appointed again. Such pressure becomes increasingly strong when the project approaches its end and the project manager's ultimate goal becomes to spend the last budgeted dollar at 23h59 on the last day of the project: like a parachutist, it​[4]​ carefully pulls its piloting strings, finely adjusting its trajectory in order to hit its landing target. Sooner or later a priority swap will take place and the beneficiaries' needs will become instrumental to fulfill the development agent's sustainability needs.

2.5. The unquestioned puzzle  
The metaphor underlying the whole game is one of a jigsaw puzzle, where the ability of the project manager is to gradually compose the pieces, so that in the end the picture will finally be identical to the one on the top of the box, taken years earlier.
Such a mindset is structurally flawed, as it discourages adaptation to the evolving reality by limiting the number and the aperture of feedback sensors and channels. It is conceived much more for talking than for listening, for forcing the situation to fit into the plan rather than adapting the plan to fit the situation (see figure 1). 

3. The role of technology
3.1. The industrialism burden
Technologically intensive projects are still mainly 
"rooted on the assumption that I[nformation] S[ystems] innovation in developing countries is mainly concerned with catching up with the technologically advanced rich economies through transferring their technologies and emulating their institutions." (Avgerou, 2008, p. 135)

This top-down approach is ingrained in the industrial revolution founding principles, out of which the whole project management cycle has stemmed. In education this dominant model proposes and imposes a mechanistic idea of education and learning that leads to castrating teachers' and pupils' creativity in order to have a standardized set of minimal skills as an output. (Robinson, 2009a, 2009b). The focus is on compensating the deficiencies instead of cultivating individuals' talents. I believe we, as development agents working in education projects in L-HDI countries, we must critically question this old industrial educational paradigm and mindfully wonder how adequate or inadequate it is for the countries where we operate. 
Technology can amplify and accelerate the way we embrace one or the other paradigm. From my experience in the field, it has been used to reinforce the industrial paradigm and its efficacy, rather than to open new, original pathways. The mind-brain/software-hardware analogy is extremely tempting and powerful. Going from this into thinking of teaching and learning as installing a software in someone's head is less than a step. This leads to underestimating both the time for significant learning​[5]​ (Bateson, 1972) to take place (especially when dealing with the introduction of new technology from scratch, like computers) and the need for an internal maintenance service. 
When both the IT trainer and the project manager come from a H-HDI country, they will probably take for granted how technologically dense their environment was, and how much exposure they had to computers and such without even asking for it. This may result in a structural bias when the two are planning an ICT4E project, namely the underestimation of the time needed for the ICTs to be picked up and used effectively by adults (teachers) coming from a technologically sparse environment. As a result, development projects in education are often "impatient" or/and bear unrealistic expectations and fall short in achieving the educational progress they aim at. 
Who serves the server? Typically, the project management is concerned with the initial set-up of the IT infrastructure for the reasons explained above (cf. §§ 2.3, 2.4) and IT experts collude by focusing on the optimisation of the technical aspects of the high-tech facility in the school. Techies love technology and may fall in the trap of setting up a system that is as automatic as possible in order to prevent the need of maintenance in the first place, especially if the school is in rural areas. Such a system might be simple to run, but most likely sophisticated and also hard to fix when it breaks. When it does, as it will, sooner or later, the only people capable to troubleshoot it are likely not be there anymore: they may be already back home in the "developed world" or in some central IT facility in the capital city. In both cases the school will choose: either stop using the faulty device (computer, printer, router, etc.) or ask a local technician to come and perform a quick and cheap repair, before the central IT facility get to know that they have "broken" the prestigious gift they had received. Most likely the local technician will not know how the system has been designed and configured, as nobody ever cared to leave such a description: «It is too complicate to explain, anyway». Thus while attempting to fix the problem she is likely to further disrupt the IT system architecture. 
If remote assistance is possible via the internet, the scenario can be less dramatic, but there is indeed a tendency to underestimate the need for local capacity building (Heeks, 2005) in maintenance skills and to shoot for a bullet proof system instead of designing one that is easy to restore. Unless she has a long experience in low IDI countries, an external IS designer will tend to underestimate the contextual constraints (black outs, misuse, low bandwidth, etc.), as these are not an issue in her home context.

As a consequence, audacious teachers who "dare" using technology in class tend to be very afraid of the slightest technological breakdown, as not only it can easily compromise a whole lecture, but more importantly it exposes them to the risk of feeling incompetent face to their pupils, thus inhibiting further attempts to use the computer room in the future.

4. Conclusions
Seconding Heeks (Heeks, 2002), I too call for a thorough scrutiny of the "soft" aspects I described, and for a critique of the current project cycle management as applied within the framework of cooperation&development practices. More effective feedback mechanisms have to be put in place in order to allow for improvisation and reduce the gap between design and actuality, thus increasing the chances of success of such initiatives. 
More importantly though, a radical change in the overarching mindset dominating both aid and education should be endorsed. 
Historically, aid has been modelled on a medical metaphor, with donor countries playing the doctors and recipient countries the patients, Structural Adjustments Programs in the 1980s being the most prominent example. The official documents produced by the aid community in the last ten years (cf. § 2.1) account for an increased consensus in moving towards a reduction of this asymmetry: a shift towards a commercial metaphor is taking place: donor as suppliers providing goods and services on-demand to beneficiaries countries, as their customers. 
Something analogous has happened in education: the instruction paradigm still dominates worldwide, with a guru-teacher dispensing knowledge to the pupils, basically indoctrinating them. In education tough, the rhetoric move towards a reduction of such asymmetry has a much longer tradition (Bruner, 1997; Cole, 1998) leading to a constructionist approach where the role of the teacher is one of a mentor, a supervisor, a facilitator for peer learning to take place (Robinson & Aronica, 2009, chap. 11).  This approach is inherently coherent with the use of so-called Web 2.0 technologies and can take enormous advantage from their use in ICT4Education projects, but more importantly, it could serve as an inspirational metaphor to reform the Aid system as a whole (Thompson, 2008). 
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^1	 . I purposely avoid the terms Developing vs Developed countries, as I reject the Human Development Index as a fair measure of development, given the absence of any sustainability indicator in its components: how can countries who are consciously and systematically destroying their own life support system be called developed? Nonetheless, due to the current lack of such a comprehensive, popular development index, I will use the acronyms L-HDI and H-HDI as a temporary and unsatisfying way to refer the so-called Developing and Developed Countries. 
^2	 . ICT Development Index (http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/idi/2009/material/IDI2009_w5.pdf)
^3	 . I am referring to the Logical Framework approach widely adopted by NGOs and cooperation&development agencies (see: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/pcm_guidelines_2004_a4.pdf ) 
^4	 . I use it and not she or he, as I consider this is applicable to both individuals and institutions.
^5	 . By this term I refer to Gregory Bateson's concept of deutero-learning, learning to learn.
